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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OBSCENITY STATUTES -
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The appellant, a Michigan bookseller, was convicted of violating a penal
statute' which made it a misdemeanor to offer for sale or to sell to anyone,
a book "containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language, . .. tend-
ing to incite minors to violent or depraved acts, manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth . . . ." On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court,2 held, reversed. The statute arbitrarily restricts freedom of
speech in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,!'
in that the incidence of the enactment would reduce the adult population
to reading only what is fit for children. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. -, 77 S.
Ct. 524 (1957).
In the United States the early cases 4 adopted the English rule of Regina
v. Hicklin,5 in which the Queen's Bench held that if any obscenity were found
which tended to deprave or corrupt "those whose minds were open to such
immoral influences," the entire book would be obscene. The courts soon
realized that a rule so broad would unavoidably encompass the classics as
well as current literary efforts of artistic value.6 The "any obscenity view"
of the Hicklin case was thus dropped in favor of the more modem concept
of viewing a book in its entirety. There are various views, however, as to
1. MiC. Comp. LAws § 750,343 (Supp. 1954).
2. In view of the denial by the Michigan Supreme Court to allow an appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted jurisdiction. Butler v. Michigan, 350 U.S.
963 (1956).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "... nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. .. "
4. United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119 (S.C.N.Y. 1913); United States v.
Bennett 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); People v. Muller, 96N.Y. 468 (1884).5. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868). "[Whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
6. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses." 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
aff'd, United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (Mr.
Justice Hand observed that classics such as Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, Venus and Adonis
and the Bible would be suppressed by the Hicklin rule).
See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HAM. L. REv. 40,
62-74 (1938).
of United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," supra note 6; New Am. Library
of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953); People v. Wepplo
78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947); American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago,
3 II1. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954); Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever
Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N.E.2d 663 (1948); Commonwealth v. lsenstadt, 318
Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 534 (1933); State v. Lerner, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 81 N.E.2d 282 (1948);
Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa.Super. 358, 16 A.2d 437 (1940).
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the type or class of readcr upon whom the test of obscenity is to be based."
In Dunlop v. United States," the United States Supreme Court used a test,
indicating that if the matter is "calculated with the ordinary reader to deprave
him, deprave his morals, or lead to impure purposes .. ." then it is obscene.
In United States v. One Book Called "Uly)sses,"' 0 Mr. Justice Woolsey, in
holding that a book's obscenity must depend upon the court's opinion as to
its effect on a person with average sex instincts, said that "it is with the
normal person that the law is concerned." Another view was expressed in
State v. Lerner," in which the Ohio Court decided that the moral concepts
of the people of that state would determine what was obscene literature.
Some jurisdictions, by following the rule of the Hicklin case in an attempt
to protect their youth,' 2 completely ignore the trend one might perceive
of prohibiting from the general reading public only that literature which
has a demoralizing influence on the normal, average, reasonable man. 13
Recognition that state obscenity statutes were violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been a difficult
achievement. Subsequent to Gitlow v. New York, 4 it became well settled
that the freedom of speech and press which is secured by the first amend-
nment 15 from abridgment by the federal government is similarly protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 But in Chaplinsky
v. New Hanipshire,17 the court stated that obscenity within narrowly limited
classes of speech was never thought to raise a constitutional question. More
recently, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,"' obscene and libelous speech were classi-
fied in the same category, in that neither was within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech. The case of Winters v. New York,' 0 although not
8. But the main problem is what excites lascivious thought or arouses lustful
desire. See Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Con-
stitution, 38 MINN. L. Rrv. 295 (1954).
9. 165 U.S. 486 (1897).
10. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
11. 51 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 81 N.E.2d 282 (1948).
12. Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 317, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); People
v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 272 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1934), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 514, 199
N.E. 513 (1935); Commonwealth v. New, 142 Pa. Super. 358, 16 A.2d 437 (1940).
13. For publications of a scientific, educational or instructive character regarding
sex relations as within the perview of statutes relating to obscene or immoral publications,
see 76 A.L.R. 1099 (1932).
14. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ..
16. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Hughes v. Superior
Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Pennekamp v. Florida, 238 U.S. 331 (1946);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Thomhill.v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940); Love]) v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937); Grosiean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
17. 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
18. 343 U.S. 250, 266, (1952).
19. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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concerned with what might be considered the traditional obscenity statute,20
reversed a conviction under a New York statute2 l that prohibited the distri-
bution of magazines principally made up of criminal news or stories pertain-
ing to deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime, "so massed as to become vehicles
for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person. '' " Thc court
held that the statute was so vague and indefinite, that it permitted within
the scope of its language the punishment of incidents within the protection
of the guarantee of the fourteenth .rnendemnt. -'
The instant case was the first decision of the Supreme Court to question
the validity of a state obscenity statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, declined to invoke the rule of the Winters2 4 case, which left
unanswered the question of vagueness. Nor does it appear that he thought
it necessary to discuss the "any obscenity" view as opposed to the "entirety"
view in applying the test of obscenity to a particular book. In this decision,
unusual for its brevity and lack of authoritative citations, lie held that a
statute prohibiting sale to the general public of a book having a tendency to
corrupt only youth was arbitrary in its restriction of freedom of speech. 2
In so doing, he brought obscene literature within the protection of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The effect of this decision placed in jeopardy obscenity statutes of seven
other states,28 including that of Florida,27 and although it may be credited
with completely overruling the Hicklin case, a far greater service could have
been performed by holding that the type of reader upon whom to base the
test of obscenity should be the average man rather than the abnormal person.
It is hoped that the next step will be to apply the clear and present danger
20. Note, 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 298 (1948). See also dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, 333 U.S. at 527 (he assumed that the statute dealt with incitement
to crime).
21. N.Y. PEN. LA , § 1141 (2).
22. The interpretation applied by the highest court in New York State. People
v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 545, 63 N.E.2d 98 (1945).
23. For illustrations as to when a statute is subject to attack as vague, indefinitc
or uncertain, see Annotation 83 L. Ed. 893 (1938).
24. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a strong dissent in the
Winters case. 333 U.S. at 520.
25. Michigan does have a penal code specifically designed to protect its youth
from such publications, by prohibiting the sale to a minor of any book "containing
obscene language . . . tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.
MiC. Comp. LAws § 750.142 (1948).
26. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 435 (1953); FLA. S'rAT. § 847.01 (1955); R.I.
G N. LAws c. 610 § 13 (1938); S.C. CODE § 16.414 (1952); Trxx. CODE ANN.§ 39-3001 (1955); VA. Cone A,-. § 18-113 (1950); WI. VA. Coon" ANN. § 6066(1955). Typical of these is Florida's:
Vhoever . . . sells or distributes any book . . . containing obscene language
or . . . discriptions manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth . . . shall be punished by imprisonment ...
27. At the time of this writing, it is understood that Florida will pattern a new
obscenity statute after the present New York statute, N.Y. PEN. LAw, § 1141.
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test of Schenck v .United States s to obscenity statutes, completing the trend
toward a more liberal and modern approach to literature of all types. How-
ever, for the present time, the Court has placed obscenity statutes clearly
within the due process clause of fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, and has given fair warning to the states that they cannot
arbitrarily restrict the sale of literature.
JOHN M. THoMsoN
REAL PROPERTY -TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES-
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION FROM ESTATE
OF DECEASED SPOUSE
Husband and wife executed notes and purchase money mortgages on
Florida properties which they owned as tenants by the entireties. After the
death of the husband, the wife sued her husband's executor for contribu-
tion and exoneration with respect to the balance owed on these notes and
mortgages. Held, a surviving spouse is not entitled to contribution or ex-
oneration from the estate of a deceased spouse for money due on notes and
purchase money mortgages executed by them where land was held by entire-
ties. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
This was a case of first impression in the Florida court, but the ques-
tions presented have been passed upon in several of the twenty jurisdictions
which recognize tenancy by entireties.t Exoneration in respect of liens on
entireties properties has generally been denied the surviving spouse.2 I How-
ever, decisions are in sharp conflict as to the right to contribution.
The courts of Indiana, :' Maryland,4 New Jersey,5 North Carolina,6 Penn-
sylvania7 and Tnnssee8 hold that the decedent's estate is liable for half
28. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). "Whether the words used, are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils. .. ."
In Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the appellant unsuccessfully
argued the applicability of the clear and present danger test to his conviction under the
New York statute prohibiting sale of obscene publications. See Lockhart and McClure,
Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954).
I. Those jurisdictions which recognize entireties are: Arkansas, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Indiana. Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
For a tabulation of conflicting attributes of entireties tenures in the several states,
see Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951). However, this exxcellent
survey does not evaluate a survivor's right to contribution.
2. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930); Gardner
v. Waldman,-R.l.-,1l1 A.2d 922 (1955).
3. Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919).
4. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 At!. 444 (1930).
5. Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N.J.Eq. 119, 156 Atd. 483 (1931).
6. Underwood v. Ward, 239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954); Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930).
7. In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa.519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); In re Kershaw's
Estate, 352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945).
8. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931).
